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1 INTRODUCTION
If the United Nations' activities were to be roughly
divided into the contentious and the cooperative,
issues concerning the global commons would obvi-
ously fall into the cooperative category. Equally
obviously, they have been far from immune to con-
troversy, both endogenic (arising out of the issue
as such) and exogenic (arising out the parties'
alignments on other issues). Three of the most
important such issues have been: the creation of a
regime to govern the mining of tracts of the sea-
bed lying outside any state's jurisdiction; the threat
to the ozone layer; and, among the issues associated
with the Earth Summit, alias the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), at Rio in 1992, the prospect of climate
change. In each of these cases, global organization
was essential both in raising the issue and in help-
ing to implement the solution adopted.
In this article the global commons refer to those
expanses, of land, sea and air, which, until recently
at least, no one state could hope to manage, but
which we now know can be either exploited,
unsustainably, for profit, or damaged, intention-
ally or not, by activities emanating from a geo-
graphically dispersed array of sources. Thus,
regulation is imperative and, for preference, at
any rate, should be global.
The tasks facing the United Nations in dealing with
the global commons have varied according to the
problem posed. It has been required, in one case,
to act as midwife/governess to a new, prospec-
tively profitable, form of economic activity, and
in others as sheriff banning, or rationing, activi-
ties hitherto regarded as perfectly legitimate. In
responding to these diverse demands, it has lived
adventurously.
2 SEA-BED MINING OUTSIDE NATIONAL
JURISDICTION
The one case in which the UN has attempted to
act as midwife has been that of sea-bed mineral
resources in the area beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. Following a Maltese initiative of 1967,
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an unopposed General Assembly resolution of
1970 declared these to be the 'common heritage of
mankind'. As coastal states rapidly incorporated,
in their concept of the continental shelf, any tract
of sea-bed that looked as if it might contain oil or
gas, the resources constituting the common herit-
age came to consist almost entirely of the varieties
of polymetallic nodules, many of them rich in
nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese, that line
much of the ocean floor. Even these came to be
shared with coastal states as the latter asserted their
jurisdiction into exclusive economic zones extend-
ing for 200 miles, which in aggregate included a
significant proportion of the more promising nod-
ule areas, but the bulk of them remained outside
national jurisdiction.
Some argued that, here, sea-bed mining is a 'free-
dom of the seas' like fishing and navigation, an
argument demolished by the fact that sea-bed
mining firms laid claim to sites, which they needed
to be able to mine exclusively for a substantial span
of time, to gain an attractive return on the heavy
investment required. Having begun to explore and
exploit a site, a given miner would hardly have
wanted other miners to exercise their freedom to
mine in his immediate vicinity. At the very least,
therefore, there had to be an international proce-
dure for determining the size of sites and allocat-
ing them to applicants.
Constructing that regime was one of the many
items on the massive agenda of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III). Sea-bed mining was thus scheduled to become
the first industry ever to be managed by an interna-
tional organization. Some of the other items on
UNCLOS III's agenda also dealt with the sea as a
global commons, notably those having to do with
the rights and duties of states in what remained of
the high seas, and in particular the duty to preserve
the marine environment. Otherwise it was mainly
concerned with defining these new zones of juris-
diction of coastal states and clarifying what they
could or could not do in each of them, issues
which this year's fishing dispute between Canada
and Spain seems to have revived. It was committed
to produce, by consensus, a single convention
comprehensively rewriting the law of the sea.
Out of this very tall order, it was the sea-bed
mining regime that proved the hardest item to
deliver. Here the alignments of states came very
close to being directly North-South. The South had
three main concerns. They wanted to use their
numerical majority in the United Nations to control
the development of the new indústry, and in par-
ticular to protect those of their number who were,
or might become, land-based producers of the min-
erals in question, from being swamped by sea-bed
competition; they wanted to be in at the start of a
new industry, both by giving the proposed Inter-
national Sea-bed Authority an operating arm, the
Enterprise, which would have funds, suitably
promising sites and the right to buy technology at
fair prices from other miners, and by gaining access
to that technology themselves, via the Enterprise;
and finally, but with a rather lower priority, they
wanted the Authority to be able in effect to tax and
redistribute the revenues states and companies
earned from sea-bed mining.
For the North, on the other hand, the overriding
aim was assured access for firms or states applying
for sites, which for them meant that all the grounds
on which an application could be rejected had to
be written into the treaty. In return for that, under
the leadership of Nixon's Henry Kissinger and
Carter's Elliot Richardson, they conceded enough
to the demands of the South for virtually complete
agreement to be reached on the Draft Convention
of 1980, leaving only a few loose ends for one last
session to clear up.
This compromise was wrecked the following year
by the incoming Reagan Administration. Some con-
cessions were made to the latter's demands, but
eventually something very similar to the Draft
Convention was adopted by majority vote, against
US opposition. The UK and Germany went on to
join the USA in refusing to sign it, and although
other developed states, and the European Commu-
nity, did sign it, no state with immediate intentions
of going into sea-bed mining ratified it. Still, any 60
ratifications were enough to bring it into force after
a further year, and it received its crucial sixtieth,
Tommy Koh, the head of the Singapore delegation, was then
chair of UNCLOS III's Negotiating Group 2, to which this ques-
tion, designated one of the remaining 'hard issues', had been
assigned in 1977. In 1981 he was made President of UNCLOS III in
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that of Guyana, in late 1993. This lent urgency to a
process apparently initiated by the former Secre-
tary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, of consulting
selected developed and developing country repre-
sentatives with a view to concocting a new compro-
mise which would bring the mining states in. In
July 1994 the General Assembly unanimously
approved a wholesale revision of the sea-bed min-
ing regime, achieving in less than four years, by
these modest, behind-the scenes consultations, the
consensus that 93 weeks of conference debates and
negotiations, open to all states, and spread over
eight years (to say nothing of the previous six in the
Sea-Bed Committee of the General Assembly) had
failed to achieve at UNCLOS III.
Most of the pre-Reagan concessions won by the
South disappeared, including provision for a pro-
duction limit which would have assured land-
based producers that, for 25 years at least, sea-
bed mining could take only part of the expected
growth segments of the copper and nickel markets.
(Cobalt exporters, who would have been hit by
almost any nodule mining, were to be given com-
pensation, a prospect which remained in the new
text, though only out of funds accruing to the
Authority from sea-bed mining). Assurances to the
Enterprise that it would be able to obtain the tech-
nology it needed at independently-arbitrated prices,
and that the money would be found to enable it to
go into business on its own from the beginning,
were removed. A highly complicated system of
payments to be levied on contractors, on which
Tommy Koh1 , with the help of computer models,
had won such widespread acceptance at UNCLOS
III that it remained unchallenged even by the
Reagan Administration's onslaught on the Draft
Convention, sank without trace and was replaced
by vague pieties. In hindsight, it became clear how
much more the Group of 77 might have gained,
in terms of a law of the sea convention that met
their demands, had they been more responsive to
Northern worries in the Kissinger-Richardson era.
3 THE OZONE LAYER
The ozone layer negotiations, by contrast, were a
response to a threat, not to an opportunity. The
layer is a global commons, offering a protective
succession to Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, of Sri Lanka, who
had died in December 1980. When the General Assembly comnilt-
ted itself, in 1989, to UNCED, it appointed him to chair the
Preparatory Commission for it.
barrier against the sun's ultra-violet rays. It
has been depleted, in recent years, by emissions
of certain chemicals which do not occur naturally,
and particularly chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which
were used in, among other things, aerosol sprays
and refrigerators, and halons, used in fire-extin-
guishers. This depletion has led to increased
incidence of skin cancer, and to agricultural degra-
dation. There appears to be no correlation between
where the chemicals are emitted and where the
consequences strike: it has been over the Antarctic
that the most striking depletion has occurred.
The tasks were, first, to establish the scientific valid-
ity of the above assertions; second, to persuade
those firms that used CFCs, or produced goods that
did, to agree to a time-table for phasing them out;
third, to bring in developing countries, which at
that time contributed only marginally to the prob-
lem, but could soon be expected to expand their
CFC-related activities dangerously; and fourth, to
enable the phase out to be accelerated, if subsequent
scientific findings were held to warrant it.
It was the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) that initiated this process, by funding a
conference of the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion (WMO) on the subject as early as 1975, and
then, in May 1977, promoting a 'world plan of
action on the ozone layer' and establishing a Co-
ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL).
It took another eight years, however, for even a
framework convention on the subject, the Vienna
Convention of 1985, to be adopted. The vagueness
of its terms reflected persisting scepticism about
the extent, and even the existence, of the hazard.
Thereafter, events moved fast. Within two years
agreement had been reached on the Montreal
Protocol, which provided for a 50 per cent cutback
in the production and consumption of five CFCs
within ten years, and a freezing of that of three
halons within three. The protocol also included
provisions for amending these targets, if scientific
evidence should warrant, by less than unanimous
decisions of 'Meetings of the Parties'. Finally, it
set itself, and achieved, the target of coming into
force, together with its parent convention, in just
15 months, that is by 1 January, 1989.
2 Szell, Patrick, 'Negotiations on the Ozone Layer', in Gunnar
Sjostedt, (ed.) International Environmental Negotiation, Sage
Publïcations for the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis's 'Processes of International Negotiation' (PIN) Project,
Newbury Park, California, 1993, p 32.
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For it to succeed, however, it had to persuade
developing countries to come into the control
system. For them, CFCs belonged to the future;
they had been looking forward to enjoying the
benefits of chemicals that were 'nonflammable,
relatively nontoxic, and among the most useful,
inexpensive and convenient refrigerants, foam-
blowing agents, and solvents available'2. China
in particular had announced plans for a twenty-
fold expansion in its production of CFC-using
refrigerators.
The protocol therefore contained two incentives,
one positive, one negative. If a developing country
became party to the Vienna-Montreal system, it
would be given a ten-year exemption from its pro-
visions, so long as its annual consumption over this
period did not exceed 0.3 kilograms per capita, an
indulgence which in China's case would have
permitted an aggregate of CFC emissions higher
than that of the USA prior to the adoption of the
protocol! If it did not, however, parties were for-
bidden to trade in CFC-related goods with it. Thus
if it expected to remain a CFC-importer, and its
suppliers had joined, it would be better off joining,
since it could then at least obtain supplies legally
during the exemption period. But if it exported
CFCs, or saw itself likely to do so in the future, it
would be tempted to stay outside and cash in on
the shortfall in supply. At this stage, it was by no
means clear that the balance of considerations would
be in favour of adherence. To generate the near-
universality the system required, then, the London
Meeting of the Parties in 1990 devised a further
inducement, the (at first Interim) Multilateral Fund,
to assist developing countries to meet the extra
costs of using CFC-free technology.
It is a measure of the success of these incentives
that whereas only seven developing countries had
originally signed the Vienna Convention, the Mon-
treal Protocol had, by November 1994, acquired
148 Parties, most of them developing countries,
including India and China.
Through these 'Meetings of the Parties' the pro-
cess of dispensing with CFCs, halons and other
ozone-depleting substances was accelerated. At
Copenhagen, in 1992, it was agreed that CFCs,
carbon tetrachioride and methyl chloroform would
be wholly phased-out by 1996, and 34 hydrobromo-
fluorocarbons (HBFCs) by 1994. 34 hydrochioro-
fluorocarbons (HCFCs), which had been developed
as much less damaging alternatives to CFCs for
use in refrigerators and in the preservation of
documents and works of art, were added to the list
of controlled substances, to be phased-out by 2030.
At Bangkok, in 1993, developed countries commit-
ted themselves to phase out the production of halons
entirely by the end of that year, and to freeze the
consumption of methyl bromide, in most of its
applications, by 1995, with the possibility of further
controls in the light of recommendations of assess-
ments panels.
As a result of these drastic decisions, worldwide
CFC production, after rising by nearly a half
between 1975 and 1988, fell by 46 per cent by
1991, an impressive testimony to the effectiveness
of this complicated episode in global law-making.
Since 1985, indeed, the world has acted, on the
ozone depletion issue, almost as if it had a single
government, determining and adjusting its policy
in the light of scientific advice, and applying it with
appropriate regard to the circumstances of each
case. Moreover, the positions originally taken
have, in several cases, been substantially revised.
Du Pont, for instance, admitted that they had exag-
gerated the costs of converting to new CFC-free
technology; and the UK, which had begun by drag-
ging its feet, became an enthusiastic supporter
from the 1990 (London) Meeting of the Parties.
Later scientific observations made it clear that the
Montreal Protocol had underestimated the damage
already done to the ozone layer. As late as 1994, the
Antarctic 'hole' in it was still growing; but, thanks
to the Montreal Protocol and its amendments, it
should stop growing by the late 1990s.
4 GLOBAL WARMING
Whereas sea-bed mining challenged the interna-
tional community to create a framework for man-
aging a new commercial activity in a global com-
mons, and ozone layer depletion demanded the
outright and rapid cessation of use of the chemicals
responsible, global warming calls for regulating
greenhouse gas emissions, not banning them. For
instance, although carbon dioxide from fossil en-
ergy constitutes more than half of all greenhouse
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gases, no-one would suggest that all human
activities emitting it should cease. The demand is
that the aggregate of such emissions should be
sharply reduced.
In the science on which such demands are based,
uncertainty abounds. It is now clear that, if no
action is taken to prevent it, global temperatures
will show a long-term tendency to rise, but how
fast this will happen, and with what consequences,
remain very much in dispute. Some say it would be
accompanied by increased incidence of storms and
droughts and that no-one would benefit, while
others calculate that there would be winners as
well as losers. It was claimed, for instance, that
Russia might gain from milder winters in Siberia,
which would extend the area that could be cropped,
and Argentina and Canada might derive analogous
benefits. The most obvious losers would be states
with low-lying coastal areas, like Bangladesh and
the Maldive Islands, for whom any rise in sea level
which global warming would produce could be
disastrous.
In 1990, the Science Working Group of an Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, set up by
the World Meteorological Organization, predicted
a rise in average global mean temperature of
1 degree by 2025 and 3 degrees by the end of the
twenty-first century, and sea-level rises of about
6cm per decade, or about two feet over the century.
This might not, in itself, sound particularly momen-
tous, but the threat of consequent loss of territory
has prompted the creation of a new pressure-group,
the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS). In
the 1980s, as well as carbon dioxide from fossils
(55 per cent), the main greenhouse gas emissions
were agricultural carbon dioxide (about 20 per
cent), methane, which is less lasting, (15 per cent),
and CFCs (just over 10 per cent). Stabilizing their
concentration in the atmosphere would apparently
require cuts of between 60 per cent and 80 per
cent in the emissions of all but methane.
An attempt to ration emissions of greenhouse gases
would encounter three major difficulties: determin-
ing a maximum permissible aggregate for any given
period; allocating this total among states (and per-
haps other actors); and devising a way of checking
that no-one emitted more than their entitlement,
difficulties analogous to those faced by the Food
and Agricultural Organization's fishery commis-
sions in trying to limit catches on the high seas to
sustainable levels before coastal state jurisdiction
expanded to cover almost all fishing stocks. The
fishery commissions failed. It will be remarkable if
the attempt to control global warming is any more
successful.
The attempt nevertheless needs to be made. It
would be rash for any country to assume that
climate change would do it no damage, and callous
to ignore the likely costs that others, mainly those
with extensive low-lying coastal areas, will bear.
Establishing a system that stabilizes concentrations
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at an accept-
able level must be among our global priorities from
now on. That achieved, we can forget about it and
concentrate on other, more creative, concerns.
Though the developed countries are, of course,
overwhelmingly responsible for the chronic and
alarming build-up of greenhouse gases, developing
countries cannot be left out of any system for
controlling them. They already account for 40 per
cent of current emissions and, if nothing is done,
this will rise to two-thirds by 2025. Halting global
warming thus requires them too to make drastic
changes in their development plans.
This does not mean that they must abandon hope
of development. As the official title of the Earth
Summit at Rio, the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development, insists, the two
aspirations are compatible. Hence the commitment
to sustainable development and the consequent
creation of the UN Commission for Sustainable
Development (CSD), implying that development
must proceed in such a way that the global
commons we leave for future generations has not
deteriorated. It is now becoming generally ac-
knowledged that, where environmentally friendly
methods and technology are more expensive, the
rich must, at least, be ready to cover the difference
for developing countries, and preferably, in return
for the latter's cooperation in protecting these
global commons, actively support their develop-
ment plans.
Five documents emerged from Rio: two con-
ventions, on Biodiversity and Climate Change,
each prepared by its own Intergovernmental
Weizsaecker, Ulrich von, Earth Politics, Zed Books, London,
1994. p 169.
Article 4.2(b).
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Negotiating Committee; the short Rio Declaration;
the somewhat ambivalent Statement of Forest
Principles, and the 800-page Agenda 21, giving a
detailed elaboration of how, over the foreseeable
future, these twin aspirations of UNCED, envi-
ronmental protection and development, could be
realized. A Desertification Convention, also mooted
at Rio, was adopted two years later. This article
will confine itself to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change. Without denying the importance
of biodiversity, desertification, and forests, they
all relate to land areas clearly falling under the
jurisdiction of one or more states, so they cannot
logically be regarded as global commons.
In adopting these conventions and declarations
of intent, UNCED confounded expectations. The
Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) which the
General Assembly had established to help UNCED
to bear fruit had held a series of sessions, and the
last, in New York in March and April 1992, ended,
according to Weizsaecker, in a mood of pervasive
gloom. 'None of the central issues had been re-
solved, neither finances, institutional arrange-
ments, climate, biodiversity or forests [and] many
observers, including nearly all German NGOs
believed it would be a festival of vanity and non-
sense'3. The Bush Administration had retreated
from an early willingness to think in terms of
specific targets for emission reductions, although
the EC and other OECD countries had offered to
commit themselves to reducing their carbon dioxide
emissions to their 1990 level by 2000. The conven-
tion does refer to this target, but in ambiguous
terms, allowing the USA to argue that, in signing it,
it was obliged merely to 'communicate detailed
information on [its] policies with the aim of return-
ing individually or jointly' to the 1990 level for all
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol4. The UK, in contrast, accepts that it is
thereby committed to take measures aimed at this
target5 and in April 1993 the newly-elected Presi-
dent Clinton brought the USA into line with the
rest of the OECD countries.
The convention came into force in 1994 and the
first meeting of its supreme body, the Conference of
the Parties (COP I), was held in Berlin this March.
It made a good start. Helped by a switch in India's
Climate Change, the UK Programme, Cm 2427, HMSO 1994,
p6.
position, which led to the emergence of a 'Green
Group' of 72 countries, COP I decided that the
convention's existing commitments to reduce green-
house gases were inadequate, and set up an ad hoc
open-ended group to negotiate 'a protocol or other
legal instrument' to strengthen them, thus follow-
ing quite closely the path trodden by the Vienna
Convention on the Ozone Layer. AOSIS, led by
Trinidad, called for a drastic further reduction in
carbon dioxide emissions, to 20 per cent below
their 1990 levels by 2005. This would have been in
line with the Toronto Targets, set out by a meeting
of experts in 1988, and the eventual achievement
of the 60 per cent to 80 per cent reductions de-
manded by the 1990 IPCC report. COP I did not
endorse this call, but there is still time. Given the
strong resistance on the part of the OPEC (oil-
exporting) countries to any new commitment, the
mandate to the ad hoc group was an achievement
in itself.
Nor did it resolve the question of voting proce-
dures. The OPEC countries, while acquiescing,
eventually, in the task assigned to this group, in-
sisted that consensus should remain the basis of
future COP decisions. Since, however, the conven-
tion allows for amendment by three-fourths of its
parties, they could be overridden by a majority
large enough and determined enough to take
that route.
More worrying are the claims many NGO observ-
ers made at COP I that, as things stand, the parties
are not on course to achieve the targets for carbon
dioxide emissions reductions they have set them-
selves. Much therefore will hang on the effective-
ness of the convention's Subsidiary Body on
Implementation (SBI) which is to hold its first
session in Geneva in October.
COP I also made progress on what is called joint
implementation. What this means is that devel-
oped countries would be able to meet targets to
which they have pledged themselves not just by
reducing their own emissions but by financing
projects which would reduce emissions by other
countries. The convention already allowed them to
do this through arrangements among themselves;
COP I agreed to allow them also to negotiate such
joint implementation with willing developing
countries during a pilot phase, but without, in this
phase, earning emission credits.
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UN handling of the climate change issue is only
now beginning to grapple with the inherent difficul-
ties described earlier in this section. It has moved
more slowly than the ozone layer negotiations,
where the first explicit and quantitative commit-
ments, embodied in the Montreal Protocol, came a
mere two years after its framework convention.
This, in itself, is no cause for dismay. Global warm-
ing is a long-term threat, and averting it is neces-
sarily a long-term enterprise.
5 FINANCIAL MECHANISMS
Appropriately, in each of the three cases examined,
where it is the developed countries that have done
almost all of the damage done so far, or, in the case
of sea bed mining, would, initially at least, make
almost all of the profits, the regulatory system that
has emerged provides for some transfer of resources
to developing countries.
The Law of the Sea Convention, as adopted in 1982,
envisaged three sources from which the Interna-
tional Sea-Bed Authority established under it would
acquire revenues for distribution among its mem-
bers: charges levied on states and companies
awarded contracts to mine; payments from coastal
states in respect of the exploitation of any part
of their shelves lying beyond the outer edge of
their 200-mile Economc Zones; and the profits to
be made by its operating arm, the Enterprise.
The agreement of 1994 threw out the substantial
payments the convention had originally required of
contractors. These had ranged from 35 per cent to
70 per cent of profits, once original investment
costs had been recovered, plus a production charge
rising from 2 per cent to 4 per cent, or, if the
contractor so chose, no profits tax but a production
charge of from 5 per cent to 12 per cent. The charges
that will replace them will be fixed by a Finance
Committee, subject to approval by the Authority's
Council. They are to be 'fair both to the contractor
and to the Authority' and comparable to those
paid by their counterparts on land. Given that
the Finance Committee, elected by the Authority's
Assembly, must include at least one sea-bed mining
state, one major importer of sea-bed minerals, and
until the Authority becomes self-supporting, the
largest five contributors to its budget, and will
operate by consensus, 'fairness to the contractor' is
likely to be the prevailing consideration.
The role of the Enterprise was also drastically re-
vised under the new agreement. It was to have
been able to go into business on its own, and to have
been given commercially attractive sites (through
the requirement that each applicant for a site shall
offer the Authority a choice between two); suffi-
cient money to exploit one site (half from interest-
free loans, half from commercial loans guaranteed
by States Parties); and, for an initial period, the
right to buy any technology it needed at prices to
be fixed by an independent tribunal (and the duty
to pass this on to developing countries planning to
enter the field themselves). All that it will now
have are the sites, and it must operate, initially at
least, through joint ventures with the contractor
supplying them.
The provision for payments by coastal states for
operations in their outer shelves (Article 82) re-
mains. Starting at 1 per cent of the value of pro-
duction in the sixth year, they rise by 1 per cent a
year to a maximum of 7 per cent from the twelfth
onward.
That same Finance Committee will also decide,
subject to the approval of the Council and the
Assembly, how these revenues are to be distrib-
uted. It is not yet clear how much profit there
is likely to be in sea-bed mining, but given the
tight grip the sea-bed mining states are keeping on
their individual and collective vetoes, the chances
of the Authority's having a substantial sum to
distribute to the needy, as a form of supplementary
aid, look slight.
The Ozone Layer system, as we have seen, had to
wait for the Second (London) Meeting of the Parties
to the Montreal Protocol to acquire a fund to smooth
the path for developing countries. Then an Interim
Fund was set up, of up to $160m for two years,
or $240m if India and China acceded, as they did.
At Copenhagen, where the Fund was made perma-
nent, a three-year target of $500m was agreed, but
a year later, the then Director, Mostafa Tolba, was
bemoaning the fact that only $18m of the first
year's $152m had been forthcoming.
The Fund is managed by an executive committee
divided equally between developed and developing
6 UNDP, UNEP, World Bank, Global Environment Facility:
Independent Evaluation of the Pilot Phase, World Bank, 1994.
The Evaluation further noted (p 136) that UNDP Resident
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country parties to the protocol, and operates through
four agencies, UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO and the World
Bank. It would appear that the developed countries
have been slow to fulfil their financial commit-
ments to this fund, in spite of the remarkable
progress many developing country parties had
made, according to Tolba, in complying with the
demands of the protocol.
The financial mechanism for which the Climate
Change Convention provides is to be operated by
'one or more existing international entities' (Article
11.1) and has been given the major preliminary task
of helping developing country Parties to prepare
their national plans. It is for the Conference of the
Parties (COP) to decide how to ensure that the
projects this mechanism supports conform with the
COP's 'policies, programme priorities and eligibil-
ity criteria'. As noted earlier, the 'interim operator'
of the mechanism is the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF), administered jointly by the UNDP,
UNEP and the World Bank, but located in, and
chaired by, the World Bank. In an independent
evaluation of its 'pilot phase', published in 1994,
concern was expressed at the keen rivalry between
the Bank and the UNDP, and the lack of a GEF
secretariat to act as arbiter between their conflicting
pressures.6 Developing countries, too, were par-
ticularly unhappy with the 'one dollar one vote'
decision making system, in contrast with the one
state one vote principle which holds good for the
United Nations' organs.
After protracted negotiations, the GEF was restruc-
tured in March 1994. It now has a 32-member
Council, half of whose members represent develop-
ing countries and the other half industrialized and
former communist countries, and a voting system
that combines that of the World Bank with that of
the UN. It received a further $2 billion in pledges
for the three years 1994-1997. These structural
changes in the GEF, and the fact that they have been
followed by an increase in financing, are remark-
able. At Berlin, COP I continued to accept the
GEF, thus restructured, as the 'interim financial
mechanism' for which the Climate Change
Convention provides.
Representatives were nowhere playing the coordinating role
envisaged in the GEF planning documents.
6 ASSESSMENT
The global commons have, over the last 30 years,
presented the United Nations with problems, and
opportunities, quite different from those in the
minds of its founders when they launched it in
1945. On sea-bed mining, ozone layer protection
and climate change, it has been called upon to
articulate, and implement, a conception of the com-
mon good that transcends the good of specific
states, groups of states and other actors such
as firms.
Its greatest achievement, so far, has been in ozone
layer protection. Since the signing of the frame-
work treaty (the Vienna Convention) of 1985,
progress has been spectacular, though, soberingly,
we cannot yet be sure that it will not be one of
those brilliantly successful operations from which
the patient fails to recover. Even so, if its momen-
tum is maintained, it may not be long before the
world has done all that remains open to it to do
to reverse the depletion of the layer, with a virtu-
ally total ban on all substances responsible for
that depletion. For prompting that impressive glo-
bal response to a crisis, the institution that can
take the credit is UNEP.
By contrast, the UN's exercise in midwifery to the
embryonic sea-bed mining industry, through the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, was a disaster. A convention emerged in 1982,
but the foetus, frightened by the Reagan Adminis-
tration and its allies, took one look at it and rushed
back into the womb. Twelve years later, a Caesarian
performed by the Secretary-General has at least
permitted a form of delivery for the infant. How
robust it will be, and how socially conscious a
citizen of the commons it will grow up into, remain
to be seen.
The issue of global warming will certainly remain
with us. Beginning with the WMO and, again,
UNEP, it moved more rapidly to a framework
convention than the ozone case had done, no doubt
stimulated by the importance of not missing the
launch-pad of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, where
it was signed, and, in consequence, firmly linked
with development. The task of averting, or sharply
slowing down, global warming remains awesome,
and commitments, both in terms of self-restraint
and of providing the money to carry the developing
countries along with the enterprise, have as yet
been modest; but the United Nations can certainly
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take credit for the way it has brought it into the
forefront of public concern and kept it there. If
ozone protection is any precedent, it is going the
right way towards translating the broad and largely
nebulous obligations of its framework convention
into specific targets. What it must also ensure, of
course, is that the targets are sufficiently stringent,
and that they are metí
The UN's success with ozone layer protection
and (so far) with the threat of global warming, in
contrast to the expensive failure of UNCLOS III's
attempt to devise a sea-bed mining regime, sug-
gests that issues concerned with the global com-
mons are best taken to technical bodies like UNEP
and WMO, rather than the General Assembly, but
this is an oversimplification.
In hindsight, the very title which the Maltese gave
to the mineral resources of the sea-bed in their
original agenda item of 1967, and which they per-
suaded the General Assembly to endorse in its 1970
Declaration of Principles, the 'common heritage of
mankind' can be seen to have contributed to
UNCLOS III's failure to devise a generally accept-
able regime for them. It made the issue emphati-
cally political, and its seductive resonance greatly
heightened expectations. Moreover, by the time
UNCLOS III came to hold its first substantive ses-
sion in Caracas in 1974, the developed world had
been rocked by the huge increases in oil prices in
the early 1970s and challenged by the General
Assembly's adoption of the Declaration and Action
Programme for a New International Economic
Order (NIEO). The developing countries were
determined that the NIEO should be reflected in the
sea-bed mining regime which UNCLOS III was to
generate, and were slow to recognize the limits on
the concessions the mining states could make, par-
ticularly on the subject of 'assured access'. It was
not inevitable that a law of the sea convention emerg-
ing from a conference like UNCLOS III should
have had to undergo major surgery before any
mining state would ratify it, but in this case the
chances of success were blighted by the fact that it
came at a time of unusual assertiveness by the
developing countries, which led them to overplay
their hand.
Two unfortunate procedural decisions further
stacked the odds against UNCLOS III's generating
an acceptable sea-bed mining regime. First, the man
appointed to the chair of the relevant committee,
Paul Engo of the Cameroun, was an unsuitable
choice. Though a good legal draughtsman, he
proved much less effective in mediating between
the differing groups than two ad hoc mediators,
Jens Evensen of Norway and Chris Pinto of Sri
Lanka, and was prone to revise the substance as
well as the wording of proposals on which they
had with great difficulty managed to secure provi-
sional agreement, and twice shattered fragile com-
promises with his alterations, which then went on
to become the conference's official texts. Yet the
principle of equitable geographical distribution dic-
tated that UNCLOS III's five chief officers should
between them cover the world's five major regions,
so that, as the only African among them, Paul Erigo
could not be replaced by a non-African, still less
by a delegate from the same country that supplied
the (original) president, Sri Lanka. This made for
tortuous progress.
The other major mistake made in setting up
UNCLOS III was to commit it to arriving at a single
comprehensive convention, by consensus. This
meant a package deal. Put crudely, in return for
assured access and for safeguards for their other
uses of the sea, in the face of coastal state enclo-
sures and creeping jurisdiction, the sea-bed mining
states - which also tended to be maritime states
whose activities took them close to other states'
coasts - were initially prepared to make concessions
giving developing countries a say and a significant
role in the sea-bed mining regime. But when, in
areas other than sea-bed mining, UNCLOS III
proved more successful, and a regime evolved
which the maritime states found tolerable, they
followed Reagan's lead, detached it from its
package, and declared it to be 'instant customary
international law', whose validity in no way de-
pended on the enactment of the comprehensive
convention of which it was supposedly part.
The Rio 'Earth Summit' - officially the UN Confer-
ence on Environment and Development (UNCED)
- made none of these mistakes. Its products, the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
Biodiversity Convention, the Rio Declaration, the
Statement of Forest Principles, Agenda 21, and,
eventually, the Desertification Convention, were
not made interdependent in the sense that subscrib-
ing to any of them meant subscribing to them all.
They were the fruits of a variety of processes: the
climate change convention originated in the IPCC
set up by the WMO, the Biodiversity Convention in
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an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee set
up by UNEP, and the others came out of the General
Assembly's own Preparatory Commission for
UNCED. Whereas UNCLOS III lasted for 93
weeks, UNCED was over in two, and was thus
short enough to induce heads of state and govern-
ment to attend. In the process as a whole, there
was much more opportunity for science to influ-
ence delegates. Indeed, the very concept of global
warming, like that of ozone depletion, can hardly
be understood except by means of a scientific theory.
That is not, of course, to pretend that politics had
no role in these deliberations, but certainly its role
was rather less dominant here than in the sea-bed
mining negotiations at UNCLOS III.
It may even be that the UN is better equipped to
meet threats to the global commons than to create
systems for managing their profitable exploitation
to the benefit of all. In the two cases considered
here, the developed countries, while clearly respon-
sible for most of the environmental damage done
so far, needed to bring in the developing countries
whose share in polluting the ozone layer and the
atmosphere was rapidly accelerating. In the case of
sea-bed mining, had it been considered as a sepa-
rate issue, the mining states did not need the devel-
oping countries to become parties to their regime,
provided that they acquiesced in its operation and
were themselves prepared to accept it once they
were in a position to go into mining themselves.
They did indeed at one point seek to develop a mini-
regime among themselves, rather as, mutatis
mutandis, they have done in Antarctica. The idea
that the global commons belong to all of us, or
at any rate to all states, and thus that we should
all share in the benefits derived from mining it, is
progressive, but difficult to realize, and has now,
in the 1994 Agreement to the Law of the Sea Con-
vention, become somewhat attenuated. Even so,
and favourable though the amended text is to sea-
bed miners, the idea is not yet dead.
There is one further way in which these global
commons issues have helped to transform the UN.
They have promoted an enhanced hospitality to
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in its de-
liberations. Contention has long persisted, in the
life of the UN, over which NGOs can be recognized
as observers at its conferences and other proceed-
ings, and what they may and may not do in that
capacity. NGOs vary widely in weight and in the
quality of their contributions, but at their best can
assist the process of global management by offering
the fruits of their expertise in debates, by moni-
toring the compliance of their governments with
agreed environmental norms, and by campaigning,
nationally and internationally, for new or more
stringent norms. NGOs cannot replace govern-
ments, and will not, and should not, be allowed to
outvote governments; but they can often outthink
governments. That they have increasingly been
given the chance to demonstrate that fact to those
on whose decisions the fate of the global commons
may rest is a development to be welcomed without
reservation.
7 CONCLUSION
Global organization has thus been indispensable in
dealing with the global commons, in spite of the
financial and other constraints under which it la-
bours. Dynamic and resourceful as it has undoubt-
edly been, it will need to be even more so over the
next 50 years.
The flexibility the United Nations has shown in
practice is in marked contrast to the rigidity of its
Charter, which can be amended only after adoption
by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly fol-
lowed by the ratifications of two-thirds of its mem-
bership, 'including all the permanent members of
the Security Council' (Article 108). Thus, any at-
tempt to create a new 'principal organ' such as an
Economic Security Council discussed elsewhere in
this Bulletin, or abolish or even alter the size, com-
position, Charter-designated functions or decision
making rules of an existing 'principal organ' could
be thwarted by the refusal of any one permanent
member to ratify the change. The permanent mem-
bers were specified in 1945, and, although at that
time they were well chosen, given the fact that the
Organization was being set up by the victors and
reflected their dominant position in the world, it
would be absurd to make UN reform permanently
hostage to that historical moment. If the Charter
were to be amended to add new permanent mem-
bers, as seems not unlikely, further UN reform
would become even more difficult, since each of
them could also block it. To improve the capacity of
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the UN to respond to a changing world, therefore,
including a world of changing threats to its
commons, Article 108 should be amended so that
subsequent amendments, at least if they did not
relate to the Security Council and security functions
would not require the ratification of all permanent
members of the Security Council before coming
into effect. Instead, amendment might be made to
require a three-quarters rather than a two-thirds
majority in the adoption vote and, correspond-
ingly, the ratification of three-quarters of the mem-
bership, as in the Climate Change Convention.
The other two changes that would better enable
the UN to respond to the as yet unpredictable
challenges it is likely to encounter in the next 50
years would be in relation to its finances. For
decades its largest contributors have been niggardly
in their willingness to finance it, and in the case of
the USA, unreliable in finding their share of budgets
to which they have agreed. Unreliability is worse
than niggardliness. It means that the Secretariat is
distracted from its tasks by uncertainties about how
it is going to pay the costs incurred in performing
them. A mortgaging system, whereby each member
handed over to it title to property of sufficient value
to cover some years' subscriptions, which the UN
could sell to cover contribution arrears (except those
caused by recognized 'force majeure') mightbe worth
introducing, even at the cost of reducing the as-
sessed share of the USA and perhaps of some other
major contributors.
Finally, the challenges of the global commons, and
in particular of global warming, give the UN the
chance to experiment with other sources of rev-
enue. Global taxes on activities that generate car-
bon dioxide emissions, such as air travel and
private motoring, might not only put more re-
sources at the UN's disposal but also contribute
towards achieving emission reduction targets by
reducing the demand for the goods to which they
were attached. In this, as in other reforms, the need
is for flexibility, the readiness to try new things,
and to abandon them if they do not work. From
its record on global commons issues, it is a virtue
the UN clearly has.
